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INTRODUCTION
As a law student with training in Marxist and neo-Marxist,
feminist, power conflict, redistributive-focused sociology, I am
interested in voices and contexts. I am intrigued by the voices which
carry the debates within the law, as well as within the law school
context. I am concerned by the stories which are privileged and
validated and those which are left unheard and on the periphery. This
study of voice, however, is not solely an academic or a scholarly
gesture; it is a personal exploration as well.' I am regularly amazed at
how I feel my voice has been disempowered, unheard and undervalued
while simultaneously remaining very privileged in the daily life I lead,
including within the law school context.2
I grew up as the offspring of what I call the "new middle-
class." My parents' labor is, like mine, that of the mind, as they are
both professors while my grandparents' labor was distinctly of the
hand. One of my grandfathers spent his life in the steel mills while the
other worked in a shoe factory. My formative values and the voices
that I privilege were certainly shaped by these dynamics, my parents
adjusting to their new class status but constantly reminding me (and
themselves) not to forget our roots, and moreover, chiding me
* A.B. 1999, cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, Vassar College; J.D. 2002, University of
Pennsylvania; Law Clerk 2003-04, Hon. Roger L. Gregory, United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Richmond, VA. I would like to thank Regina Austin
for providing the forum within which to write this piece, her suggestions on the
work, as well as her support over the past three years. I would also like to thank
Ezekiel Edwards for his comments on this piece.
1 As CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA write: "Who we are and our
genealogies are relevant to what we believe and to how the reader will respond to
us." WE WON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, xix
(1997). See also Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A
Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989).
2 See LANI GU1NIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997); LOUISE HARMON & DEBORAH W. POST,
CULTIVATING INTELLIGENCE: POWER, LAW, AND THE POLITICS OF TEACHING (1996).
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whenever I failed to recognize the challenges faced by others
similarly, or more often not so similarly, situated as we were. I grew
up with the stories of how my mother, now a feminist teacher and
scholar, was a young, loud voice against segregation in her Southern
river town, and of how my father spent years as a VISTA volunteer
living in Spanish Harlem before he went to graduate school. These
voices of challenge and struggle shape mine, but so too do privilege
and opportunity shape my voice.
3
Although I grew up in a multi-racial, lower-middle class
neighborhood (a conscious decision by my parents to individually lash
back at increasingly segregated neighborhoods and have their children
raised in a diverse community), I had much better chances of leaving,
a privilege not accorded many of my neighbors or the children with
whom I walked to school. My privilege let me find a scholarly voice
in one of the most elite and expensive liberal arts colleges in the
country, though thankfully also an institution that might also claim
title to most truly "liberal." Four years of willful and gleeful
indoctrination in socialism, queer studies, Critical Race Theory and
Critical Race Feminism offered me a valuable set of tools and
vocabularies to challenge the world in which we live.4 I thought I
would regularly be able to utilize these tools and theories in the law
school context, challenging the Master's voice in many of the
languages of the Master.
Instead of being engaged in the dialogue I envisioned where I
could utilize my education and life experience to challenge many of
the value systems embedded within the law, I simply felt bludgeoned
3 Whiteness, as well as other dominant power "nesses" within American society,
"impl[y] living a life that is intimately connected -in identifiable ways - to the
international dynamics that are so radically altering the economic, political, and
cultural relations in many nations throughout the world. It is not necessarily based
on a conscious choice. Rather, it is deeply cemented into our commonplace
understandings of daily life. . . . Whiteness, then, is a metaphor for privilege."
Michael W. Apple, Whiteness, Education, and Cheap French Fries, in OFF WHITE
125, 121-128 (Michelle Fine, Lois Weis, et al. eds., 1997).
4 1 credit Vassar College Professors Luke C. Harris, Pinar Batur and Eileen Leonard
for helping me obtain the tools to write and fight. If I capture a fraction of the power
with which Professor Harris writes in his most influential, My Two Mothers,
America and the Million Man March, in BLACK MEN ON RACE, GENDER, AND
SEXUALITY: A CRITICAL READER 54-67 (Devon W. Carbado ed., 1999), then I have
succeeded. See also Joe Feagin, Heman Vera and Pinar Batur, WHITE RACISM: THE
BASICS (2000).
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by my first year legal education. I like to refer to my first year of law
school as "Capitalism 101" as American capitalism was stressed as a
value-free necessity rather than as the conscious choice, imbued with
subordination, discrimination and alienation, that I had examined as an
undergraduate. The class system and inequitable material conditions
of our society were simply taken for granted rather than viewed as
points of departure for scholarly debate. Yes, issues like race
occasionally appeared on the table but rarely did they leave the sterile,
not fully contextualized domain of Brown5 and its aftermath6 whereas
topics like radical feminist critiques of the law and queer theory,
which had seemed canonical only a year before, were invisible. I was
beaten to the point where I was both satisfied and pleasantly surprised
when the voices I heard in class, whether from students or professors,
echoed L.B.J.-era liberalism. I believe that those who disseminate this
law school pedagogy perceive themselves as neutral or objective,
believing that their white, capitalist, heterosexual, male norms are
devoid of political content. 7 The law school experience as presented
by my professors and peers has largely failed, in Mari Matsuda's
5 See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 493 (1954).
6 See generally, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). See also David
Benjamin Oppenheimer, Martin Luther King, Walker v. City of Birmingham, and the
Letter from Birmingham Jail, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791 (1993) (discussing the
inability of the major constitutional law casebooks to properly contextualize Walker
v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), where the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Bull Connor and upheld convictions of civil rights leaders while utterly ignoring the
gravity and human dimensions of the civil rights struggle and the racist courts).
7 See generally Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of
Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984) (suggesting that white
scholars are often prevented from mounting an effective struggle against racism and
moreover lack the tools to recognize the persistence of inequality in general);
Frances Lee Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CALIF.
L. REV. 1512 (1991); Harlon L. Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARVARD C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 435 (1987). See also Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical
Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 853 (1995) (arguing that the
critiques of merit and white norms which could threaten the dominant law school
culture as well as social norms are inherently anti-Semitic).
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terms, to recognize that law as taught is "a system that makes sense
only from a particular viewpoint," rather they believe it is the
viewpoint.
8
In certain ways I understand this value-free fagade. For this is
professional school, an endeavor designed to help students succeed
within (not outside) the active canon. Indeed, during my second-year
of law school I learned in on-campus recruiting what stories "should"
be told, and what parts of my rrsum& (which is to say which parts of
mysel/) "needed" disguising and manipulating as not to offend those in
power. I also realize that the voices I respect most within the law,
those which are salient because they describe the contexts in which I
live and how the law affects real people, are not valued. Through its
silence, the law - both in its "mainstream" scholarship and in the
briefs submitted to courts and the opinions the nation's courts publish
- reject the bodies of knowledge, such as Critical Race Theory and
radical feminism, which I hold dear. Larry Cata Backer has
exhaustively studied how the courts have received the work of the
post-modern academic legal community, and concludes that the
"outsider" scholarship of women and people of color9 has largely been
either shunned or demonized in the courts. 10 He concludes:
What stands out most, however, at both the state and
federal level, is the silence. Courts, even hostile courts,
rarely take the time to cite, much less ridicule, demean
or demonize the work of these scholars. To that extent,
the ideas propounded by those scholars, for the most
8 MARI J. MATSUDA, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudential Method, in WHERE IS YOUR BODY?: AND OTHER ESSAYS ON RACE
GENDER AND THE LAW 7, 3-12 (1996).
9 I use the term "people of color" throughout this piece, realizing that it is sloppy,
overbroad and insufficient to describe the experiences within or between groups.
Accordingly, I do not intend to essentialize such experiences but I believe that in this
context the term can be empowering. The phrase "people of color" has some
potential to bring together different voices to advance a particular cause or set of
causes and to stress that the historically disadvantaged continue to face exclusion.
10 See Larry Cata Backer, Forging Our Identity. Transformative Resistance in the
Areas of Work, Class, and the Law. Measuring the Penetration of Outsider
Scholarship into the Courts: Indifference, Hostility, Engagement, 33 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 1173, 1179 (2000) (arguing that outsider scholarship and its desire for
profound social change continue to be shunned and demonized by the courts and
traditional legal scholars).
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part, have not yet failed to become a well-established
part of the dialog of formal law making in America."I
Given that the dominant American legal paradigm ignores
bodies of work including Critical Race Theory, Critical Legal Theory,
Radical Feminism, Multiculturalism
12 and "controversial" scholars 3
who graduated from and teach at the "best," most elite law schools in
the country, it should come as little surprise that my - largely
unpublished, unacclaimed, unlaurelled, untenured - voice goes
unheard. Yet, I proudly note that I typed the first draft of this essay
for a course at my Ivy League law school that encouraged my voice,
urged me to convey my opinions and my viewpoints, and allowed
them to move beyond the silence. 14  I embrace the opportunity to
break through the shroud of silence that covers many of my days
within the walls of the law school; as the Irish cultural theorist Luke
Gibbons has so aptly noted about silence in a far graver context: "[T]o
be forgotten and written out of history is to die again.... [T]he past is
not over until its story has been told."'15 I take this chance to shout
aloud about my vision, seize the moment where my voice will again
find itself heard within my minute law school community, and
" Id. at 1182.
12Seeid. at 1184.
13 Backer's study focused on the courts' citation patterns of the following scholars,
all intellectual heavy-weights within their realm of legal academia, Harlon Dalton,
Ruthann Robeson, Jerome Culp, Gerald Lopez, Stanley Fish, Richard Delgado,
Catherine MacKinnon, Patricia Williams, Lani Guinier, Derrick Bell, Charles
Lawrence III, Duncan Kennedy, Mar Matsuda, Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Gary Peller,
Neil Gotanda, and Janet Halley. See id. at 1192-1207.
14 Although in this context, I write of silence as disempowering for a progressive
white person, I acknowledge that in other contexts silence would allow me to
exercise white privilege. See generally, Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D.
Davis, Language and Silence. Making Systems of Privilege Visible, in CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 660, 657-663 (Richard Delgado and Jean
Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000).
15 Luke Gibbons, Doing Justice to the Past, in IRISH HUNGER 269, 258-270 (Tom
Hayden ed., 1997).
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eventually in legal academia, the legal profession, and multi-
dimensional, intersectional' 6 politics.
I believe that I have a distinct role to play within this
community as well as within the profession I am preparing to enter.
For I will argue that as an anti-racist, feminist, heterosexual,
progressive male, '7 my voice is needed in the search for multi-cultural
coalitions and within a professional school and professional dynamic
which need enlightening. 18  1 realize, however, that within these
intellectual and activist pursuits, I face a dual struggle. First, as has
often been the case in law school, my voice will often be ignored,
criticized and challenged for its betrayal of the norms of white
privilege, capitalism, heterosexism19 and patriarchy. Second, even as
16 For the quintessential discussions of the importance of intersectionality in
analyzing problems of race, class, gender and sexual orientation, see generally,
Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist
Policies, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989); Kimberl Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,
43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1991).
17 The focus of my piece is racism, specifically that related to whiteness as property,
however, I do not intend to detract from other privileged systems of operation which
continue to oppress groups and individuals. In executing such complex identity
work, I do not intend to imply that I think these categories are static or that
oppression and discrimination are monolithic experiences regardless of category. It
is my intent to write with Trina Grillo's and Stephanie Wildman's anti-essentialist
warning in mind: "[C]omparing sexism to racism perpetuates patterns of racial
domination by marginalizing and obscuring the different roles that race plays in the
lives of people of color and of whites. The comparison minimizes the impact of
racism, rendering it an insignificant phenomenon -one of a laundry list of -isms or
oppressions that society must suffer." Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman,
Obscuring the Importance of Race. The Implication of Making Comparisons
Between Racism and Sexism (or Other -Isms, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
CUTTING EDGE, supra note 14, 650, 648-656.
18 As bell hooks writes, "It is our collective responsibility as people of color and as
white people who are committed to ending white supremacy to help one another. It
is our collective responsibility to educate for critical consciousness." KILLING RAGE:
ENDING RACISM 194 (1995).
19 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race:
Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFFALO L.
REV. 1 (1999) (for insight into the ways in which even theory with the best
intentions often ignores the sexualization of race and serves to further subordinate
and form hierarchies based on race and sexual orientation).
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my voice is ignored in some circles, I must also come to terms with
the privileged position it occupies nonetheless. Indeed, I have access
- through a richly textured liberal arts education and the doors that an
Ivy League legal education opens, benefits I have received, in large
part, because the color of my skin, my background and my gender
made them easier to obtain - to a variety of forums and opportunities
denied many others within this society. My goal is, then, to use my
privileged position within society to challenge that very position, the
set of norms and structures which have made my status more
obtainable. 20 Yet, I wish to avoid the "double binds of whiteness" as
best I can, resisting dynamics which essentialize race and gender as
systems of stable meaning and attempting to be an ally to causes I
believe in while not falling prey to the paternalism which almost
inherently attaches itself to being a "white ally.",
2 1
To pursue this project requires honesty with myself and a
forthright assessment of the contexts from which I came and which
continue to inform my vision. As such, I believe that writing which is
not disconnected from my life history and interactions is my most
20 1 readily acknowledge that the sacrifices I make in pursuing these goals are in
some ways insubstantial. I continue to benefit from my background, gender and
color of my skin. Even as I try to uncover my "unconscious racism" I continue to
benefit from its societal advantages without so intending. See Charles Lawrence III,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that Americans are all racists as a result of our
shared experiences and adoption of discrimination and racism). Nonetheless, I wish
to confront this project, "attempt[ing] to dismantle Whiteness as it currently exists.
.Whites must consciously repudiate Whiteness as it is currently constituted in the
systems of meaning which are races." Ian F. Haney Lopez, White by Law, in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 14, 632, 626-34.
21 See generally, Elizabeth Ellsworth, Double Binds of Whiteness, in OFF WHITE,
supra note 3, 259-69. My thinking owes much to Ellsworth's thorough, open-ended
and anti-essentialist analysis. I try to keep in mind her cautionary conclusions as a
guide for my thought and writing and a shield against the dangers of the
normalization of my whiteness and other "ness(es)" and "isms" into dichotomized,
insoluble frameworks: "The racialized frames that structure academic ways of
knowing and of interrelating, such as defining, speaking from the position of the one
who knows, having the last word - must be responded to not as frames, but as
questions." Id. at 268.
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valuable tool; I pursue a scholarship and oppositional politics
informed by who I am which requires that it is based in story-telling.
In this essay, I set forth a number of personal vignettes that I believe
are illustrative of the challenges I face as a progressive, white thinker
and lawyer. I intend that these stories display the ambivalence I have
about a system which simultaneously accepts and adopts my voice
while ignoring its content. I hope the stories also convey the
importance of context and place, that the privilege I am often accorded
is socially constructed and not ordained. Moving from the stories, I
intend to examine my role within a system where "whiteness as
property" 22 and white privilege23 continue to be the norms and to take
issue with Professor Derrick Bell's recent articulation of his views on
the role of whiteness 24 within emancipatory politics, racial and
otherwise.
SHOTS IN THE DARK: DISPLACEMENT, FALLING OUT OF CONTEXT,
MY VOICE (UNKNOWINGLY) SHAPING AND ESTABLISHING THE
DOMINANT STORY.
When I was sixteen, a high school junior, several friends and I
went to a party hosted by a friend of ours. In many respects, the party
differed very little from the routine high school fare in my small,
working-class, post-industrial town, Jackson, Michigan.25 The host's
parents had left for the weekend and in their absence, the home was
crammed with young bodies, many imbibing alcohol and smoking
marijuana. I tend to think that this picture of my town is no different
than many across the Midwest and the country in general; regardless,
it certainly was the norm in Jackson. Yet, the party instantly stood out
from those I attended during my high school years in that we, the
22 Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993). My
thinking in this essay is indebted to Harris' brilliant articulation of the property
interest in my color (as well as gender and sexual orientation) which I necessarily
carry with me every day.
23 See Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, 49
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 31-36 (1990).
24 See Derrick Bell, Wanted: A White Leader Able to Free Whites of Racism, 33 U.C.
DAvIs L. REV. 527 (2000).
25 In 1994, the year of the incident I describe, MONEY magazine ranked Jackson,
Michigan the worst place to live in America, three places behind the more famed
city of Flint. See Marguerite T. Smith & Sheryl Nance-Nash, The Best Places to
Live in America, MONEY, Sept. 1, 1994, at 1994 WL 11047318.
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group of seven friends who arrived together, were white, while the
host and the eighty to one hundred other guests that populated the
residence were Black.2 6
Like most cities in the nation's rust belt, my hometown was
rocked by segregation at all levels - residential, occupational,
27 2educational, and social. On this night, however, a mutual friend28
had invited us to his parents' home, and we gladly attended. Not
surprisingly, the party unfolded like any other, except for once within
the social spaces of my high school interaction, I was in the minority.
There was no palpable tension; conversations and interactions flowed
26 Throughout this essay, I capitalize the term "Black" to connote a specific cultural
group (while leaving "white" in lowercase), though I am cognizant that the
experiences of Blacks within this country are greatly diverging, marked by their
interrelations to gender, sexual orientation, national origin, class and knowledge.
See Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, supra note 16, at 1241, n 5 (1991) ("I use 'Black'
and 'African American' interchangeably throughout this article. I capitalize 'Black'
because 'Blacks,' like Asians, Latinos, and other 'minorities,' constitute a specific
cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.' By the same
token, I do not capitalize "white," which is not a proper noun, since whites do not
constitute a specific cultural group. For the same reason, I do not capitalize 'women
of color."' (citations omitted)). But see, Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind But Now I
See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91
MICH. L. REV. 953, 954-55, n 7 (1993) (choosing not to capitalize black or white to
encourage whites to break free from the tendency to associate race with people of
color and to develop a positive racial awareness of whiteness).
27 Indeed there was only one public high school; however, the faces I came across in
my "college bound" classes were almost exclusively white with smatterings of
Blacks, Latino/as and Asians. Furthermore my school district's faculty diversity was
compromised by Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), in which the
Supreme Court struck down a collective bargaining agreement which offered Blacks
modest protection against seniority based layoffs. Such grandfather clauses, though
facially neutral, have a profound disparate impact on communities of color. See
generally Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297
(1990) (discussing Wygant and other affirmative action programs in which whites
mistakenly attempt to cast themselves as victims).
28 Again, someone whom I never had the opportunity to be in class with, but had
gotten to know through the more typical form of inter-racial interaction at my high
school - athletics and running track.
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as readily between people I'd never met or seen as they did with my
white peers, it was indeed a standard high school night - small talk
and gossip, nothing outside of my frame of reference, just a difference
of color.
Yet, as I stood in the kitchen saying good-bye to old friends
and new acquaintances, the party and the sum of my life experiences
were dramatically altered. Above the din of hip-hop and party chatter
rang out a series of shots. Though I'd never heard or seen a gun fired,
the sound was unmistakable. Adrenaline charged and a seemingly
timeless series of events followed: I jumped onto the floor, found
myself smothered by panicked fleeing party-goers, unable to go out
the door, I dove headfirst down the basement stairs instead, found
myself covered in blood as shots continued upstairs and I was
suddenly in the company of two men with guns below, a harried
search for an escape ensued, a friend and I broke through a window
and climbed out to the safety of our cars as the night was, in a sense,
over.
That one person was murdered and a friend of mine hit by an
errant bullet assured that the night will never truly be "over" for me,
but the reactions at school from peers, teachers and administrators as
well as the outcry in the community allowed the night to live on in that
more immediate time frame as well. When we, the white students who
had witnessed the shooting, returned to school, we were criticized by
our peers, teachers and administrators. "How could you have been
there?" they asked. A not so subtle reference to the continued societal
belief in a pathology of Black violence2 9 and the unuttered notion that
somehow we deserved the violence that we witnessed because we had
removed ourselves from the segregated world of high school
socialization and chose to attend a racially mixed party. In a sense, we
got what we asked for because we did not possess white fear, 30 and
were not threatened by the atmosphere of a racially diverse party.
29 See Grace Frank, FSU forum discusses professor's racial views, TAMPA TRIB.,
April 7, 1999, at Florida/Metro 2 (discussing Florida State University psychology
Professor Glayde Whitney's writings on Black genetic inferiority and predisposition
to violence); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ
AND THE LAW ON TRIAL (1988).
30 See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo 's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears - On
The Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503 (1994); Jody D. Armour,
Race 'lpsa Loquitur': Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary
Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994); FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE
MASKS (1967).
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Furthermore, there was an implication that by attending an event in
which my white peers and superiors believed violence was inherently
present, we had needlessly ceded some of our white privilege. Their
question, "Why were you there?" really meant, with so many white
(read safe) social opportunities, why was it necessary to desegregate
yourselves socially, what did you have to gain?
I felt and still believe that those who judged and analyzed my
presence at the party have little understanding of the full scope of the
events that took place that evening. First, the implication was that
these violent occurrences only happen at those parties and in that
community. Such a belief first obscures the tragic nature of the
violence and the loss of innocence all of us who were in attendance,
Black or white,3 1 experienced. Additionally such a belief allows the
white community to disassociate itself from its close ties to handgun
violence, particularly with the rise of school shootings at
predominantly white, upper-class institutions 32 as well as the
numerous accepted forms of violence that routinely take place within
white social groups nationwide. 33 Indeed, in my hometown, violence
31 While the incidences of black-on-black violence and rates of black victimization
are admittedly higher than in white communities, see MANNING MARABLE, Violence,
Resistance, and Black Empowerment, 124-133 in SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER 127-
28, 124-33 (1996), I would venture that the overwhelming majority of people at the
party had never witnessed such an event.
32 After the infamous "Trenchcoat Mafia" shooting of April 1999 in wealthy
Littleton, Colorado, a host of angry white, middle/upper-middle class, suburban
teens followed suit with increasing prevalence. Perhaps most strikingly such
shootings have caused the suburban parents to realize that the initial refrain "this
doesn't happen in places like this" has become outdated and unrealistic. See
generally Howard Fineman, Under Fire, NEWSWEEK, May 31, 1999, at 24; Claudia
Kalb, et al., Schools on the Alert, Newsweek, Aug. 23, 1999, at 42.
33 See generally Robert D. McFadden, Hazing Scandal at High School Horrifies
Town in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, February 25, 2000, at BI (discussing high school
wrestling team's hazing rituals which included a 15-year-old boy having been hog-
tied, slammed into a wall, locked up for a half-hour several times in a gymnasium
locker and held down once while teammates forced a plastic knife into his rectum);
Jodi S. Cohen, U-M Fraternity Disbands After Hazing: Alpha Epsilon Pi Pledge was
Shot in Groin with BB Gun, DET. NEWS, February 1, 2000, at Dl (discussing how
fraternity hazing ritual led to the shooting of a University of Michigan pledge);
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had long been a routine part of the middle-class white social
interaction with which I was familiar. From elementary school
through high school, there were a slew of fights every day - in the
cafeteria, at gym, in the halls between classes. My peers thought
fighting was the natural solution to any problem. High school dating
almost inevitably meant that there would be a fight between the new
beau and the jilted ex-boyfriend. However, the violent dynamics did
not begin with our teenage years nor did it leave out parental
involvement. I recall one parent whose son had been bested in a fight
traveling to his child's private, Catholic elementary school the next
day to pin down the winning child and allowing his two children to
pummel the boy for retribution. After a "minors level" (ages eight -
ten) Little League game, a coach, whose son had been hurt when he
was struck by a pitch, threatened the pitcher with a shotgun he drew
from his truck. Yet my community was rarely troubled by these
events, they were seemingly viewed as natural elements of maleness
and whiteness. After all, the Little League coach/shotgun aggressor
merely received a year's suspension from the league and no charges
were filed.
While a certain degree of "safe," normalized violence had
always been tolerated, after the shooting, my school administration
and community wanted to create a polarized vision of the party - a
story of opposites: honor roll, white middle/upper-middle professional
class meets the drop-outs, the uneducated. How could that have been
fun? 34 As if our high school parties had been about sitting in a circle
reading Proust and philosophizing about the ills of the world. What
Player, Dad Sentenced for Sharp Helmet Buckle, ORLANDO SENTINEL, December
24, 1996, at A8 (discussing how a 48-year-old parent of a high school football player
had sharpened his son's helmet buckle to help him retaliate for having been roughed
up in an earlier game); Attorney General Backs Vermont Hazing Charge, N.Y.
TIMES, February 4, 2000, at D2 (examining the University of Vermont men's hockey
team's use of hazing, including forcing freshmen players to drink alcohol and
perform degrading acts, which led to an NCAA suspension and prosecution);
Athletes Abusing Athletes, http://espn.go.com/otl/hazing/monday.html, April 14,
2001.
34 Although I seek to break down the black/white binary that hinders the study of the
complexity of race in this country, this oppositional framework of absolutes seems
most native to the Black/white paradigm. See Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment. Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, supra
note 15, at 1373 (discussing historical oppositional dualities between whites and
Blacks, such as industrious/lazy, responsible/shiftless, knowledgeable/ignorant, etc.).
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would be most shocking perhaps to those who criticized our behavior
is how little the party differed from those I generally attended. Yes,
the people were Black, the house was in the supposed 'hood rather
than the vaunted 'burbs (the pathology of both can be debated in
another forum), but the music and the activities had little variance -
kids hanging out, talking about sports, gossiping about girls and guys
and drinking.
Although the community certainly had some degree of
sympathy for me because witnessing a shooting is a psychologically
wrenching event, the predominant view in the months that followed
remained that we, seven white students, were pariahs. The question
was repeated: How could you have been there? However, four months
later when the shooter's trial for homicide arose, the terrain shifted
dramatically.
In awaiting and then testifying at the murder trial, I personally
experienced and fully realized, for the first time, the power that my
white voice held within the legal sphere, the privilege that my story
was accorded. Before the trial, teachers, peers and figures in the
community continued to cast me as out of place in attending the party
- too Black, too near the "other" and not white enough. However, as
trial began, suddenly the perspectives changed: I was now portrayed as
a victim who needed vindication for the purity of other whites who
could have fallen prey to such a violent act, and my white voice was
the tonic the law required. In early July, when I first arrived at the
courthouse and entered the witness lounge, I knew that I would see the
six white friends with whom I attended the party. I also thought that I
would be reintroduced to many of the hundred-plus Black individuals
who were at the party that night. Yet, as eyewitness after eyewitness
was called, I realized my group of seven was at the forefront and there
was an utter dearth of Black voices. When I was called to the stand,
my story was - or should have been in a legal sense - largely
insignificant. I saw the accused murderer at the party, but I could not
place him as the shooter. Rather I could only place him in a room
from which the shots were fired. However, as he fired from that room
he was surrounded by some twenty-five - forty Black individuals -
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many of whom obviously saw his face and the event itself in much
greater detail than I - only one of whom took the stand.35
The mantra - How could you have been there? - was
jettisoned in this new legal environment, and in the prosecutor's
consciousness was replaced by "How did you envision the evening?
How did it make you feel? Describe your terror and panic as you
heard the shots." I know now my role. I was the white victim. A
boyish face, college bound, the child of professors, headed for a year
as an exchange student in Europe (the prosecutor had me tell the jury
all these details), someone with whom the largely white jury could
identify, 36 projecting themselves and their children onto me, recoiling
in horror at the way in which my sacred space had been broken by the
stereotypical young Black male perpetrator. This horror in and of
itself is not wrong, for I was victimized as were my white friends, but
so too were the myriad of Blacks who came to the party just like us,
seeking no trouble, whose voices the law did not wish to hear.37 Thus,
the trial replicated a centuries old practice of discounting the testimony
of Black witnesses, while the non-white individuals are no longer
35 1 find the language from Jordan v. Smith, 14 Ohio 199, at 4-5 (1846), particularly
striking: "No matter how pure the character, yet, if the color is not right, the man can
not testify. The truth shall not be received from a black man, to settle a controversy
where a white man is a party. Let a man be Christian or infidel; let him be Turk, Jew,
or Mahometan; let him be of good character or bad; even let him be sunk to the
lowest depths of degradation; he may be a witness in our courts if he is not black."
36 For examination of how minorities are under-represented on juries, see David
Kairys et al., Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists, 65 CAL.
L. REv. 776 (1977); Nancy J. King & G. Thomas Munsterman, Stratified Juror
Selection: Cross-section by Design, 79 Judicature 273, 273 (1996) ("[The] inability
to secure racial and ethnic diversity on lists of qualified jurors remains the most
intractable problem in jury administration today.").
37 I am cognizant of, though an outsider to, the intra-neighborhood pressures of
testifying and the ways in which community justice operates. However, I do not
believe the prosecutor was simply unable to have Blacks testify; rather my voice
served a conscious need of his to lend a certain legitimacy and narrative of
victimization to the largely white jury.
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formally forbidden by the law to testify, 38 the de facto systems of legal
norms continue to preclude their viability.
39
Essentially my testimony and the white norm it represented
formed the background which the law takes to be "value free" and
natural, and the content of that testimony was to be interpreted as a
greater truth, a more valued system of meaning - in sum, the violence
I experienced was interpreted as being more grievous because my
whiteness and class were supposed to act as shields against such
transgressions. Cheryl Harris writes: "In protecting settled
expectations based on white privilege, American law has recognized a
property interest in whiteness that, although unacknowledged, now
forms the background against which legal disputes are framed, argued,
and adjudicated., 40  The legal dispute, a homicide case, though an
instance of Black-on-Black violence which claimed a young Black
man's life but incidentally hit a white bystander, was framed as our
dispute - the innocent white faces who had been violated by this
shooter. Here, our whiteness and the privilege we had in living in
relatively safe communities was at work, as this event represented a
threat to our white entitlement. Cheryl Harris writes that, like with
traditional forms of property, "the law has accorded 'holders' of
whiteness.. .the rights of possession, use and disposition.. .the right to
38 See Adrienne D. Davis, Identity Notes Part One: Playing in the Light, 45 AM. U.L.
REV. 695, 709-15 (1996) (discussing California's nineteenth century exclusion of
non-white witness testimony); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF
COLOR 176, 253-54 (1978) (discussing how in colonial South Carolina, conviction
of a white servant who killed a slave depended on corroboration by two white
witnesses, making conviction extremely unlikely.).
39 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of
Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261 (1996) (discussing how modem courts
continue to weight the credibility of Black and white witnesses differently, accepting
the testimony of white witnesses whilst ignoring their vested interests to lie.); Joseph
W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 CONN. L. REv.
1 (2000) (arguing that white jurors, even those well-intended and free of racial
animus, will be unable to dependably judge the demeanor of a witness of a different
race because they are unable to accurately decipher the cues that the witness uses to
communicate sincerity).
40 Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, supra note 22, at 1713-14.
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use and enjoyment, and the right to exclude others."41  It is the
exclusion that is most prominent. Whiteness, like other dominant
positions of identity which the law privileges (voices rooted in
maleness, heterosexism, patriarchy, and the upper class), becomes
inalienable property-an objective social fact, where the flip side of
the privilege is inherently the subordination of people of color,
women, and other groups.
4 2
Harris argues the law has been key in affirming the importance
of whiteness as property, because law has functioned "to 'parcel out
social standing according to race' and to facilitate systematic
discrimination by articulating 'seemingly precise definitions of racial
group membership."' 43 Law took the ideology embedded in race and
formalized it into rigid definitions where whiteness was equated with
privilege. "It convert[ed an] abstract concept into an entity.",4' At the
time of trial, I recall being aware of and finding it strange that the case
seemed to depend almost entirely on the testimony of the whites who
were a tiny minority at the party, an aspect of the dynamic which I
now find most threatening. At the time, my surprise was outgrowth of
what Barbara Flagg calls the "transparency of whiteness" - "the
tendency of whites not to think about whiteness, or about norms,
behaviors, or perspectives that are white-specific., 45  As George
Lipsitz writes, "white power secures its dominance by not seeming to
be anything in particular." 46  And by not "seeming to be anything in
particular," whiteness and other forms of dominant voice reinforce
their own embeddedness and power, causing us to believe that they are
immutable, set in stone rather than social constructions.
THE TEMPORALITY OF PRIVILEGE: DERRY ENCOUNTERED
During the summer of 1998, I lived in Derry, Northern Ireland
where I was working as a research fellow at a non-sectarian think tank.
41 Id. at 1731.
42 Although Harris' article largely fails to break free from what I see as a limited
Black-white paradigm, I find its theoretical import clearly applicable to other races
as well as to other dynamics of inequality and subordination which the law (lawyers,
judges, juries and scholars alike) sanctions through its valuation of voice.
43 Id. at 1737 (citations omitted).
44 Id. at 1741 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
45 Flagg, supra note 26, at 957.
46 GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: How WHITE
PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS, 1 (1998).
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I went to the north of Ireland, the land of my ancestral home, to
complete research on Irish identity for my senior thesis and to work on
the institute's projects on ethnic warfare and conflict resolution
worldwide. One day, I offered to assist with a friend's project on
creating a "virtual Derry," my role was simply to shoot video of
Derry's city walls 47 which had been constructed between 1614-19 so
that he could compose a real-time computer model. Although the
walls are charged with historical significance in the struggle between
the city's Catholics and Protestants,48 the project I embarked on was
entirely apolitical and aesthetic.
I shot continuous video footage of the contours of the walls,
but ceased filming along the several military installations upon the
walls which the government does not permit to be photographed. At
one point, I stopped to change the camera's battery and as I was doing
so an officer of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) approached me
and asked what I was doing. I described my friend's project, with its
focus on the stones and shapes of the walls, and presented the officer
47 See http://derry.local.ie/content35277.shtml.
48 In 1689, Catholic forces of King James II sieged Derry unsucessfully for 105 days
as William of Orange's garrison utilized the walls to stand the charge. See
generally, PAUL HIPPSLEY, DERRY'S WALLS (1994). Now, some 300 years later,
Protestants in Derry and across the North continue to celebrate the victory of King
James. In 1969, the Protestant marchers taunted Catholics as rioting broke out,
culminating in the Battle of the Bogside in Derry and then spreading across Northern
Ireland. The history of Derry has been charged since, as events like Bloody Sunday
(January 30, 1972) where 21 soldiers fired 108 rounds into a crowd of unarmed
Catholic demonstrators, killing 13. See generally, EAMONN MCCANN & MAUREEN
SHIELS, BLOODY SUNDAY IN DERRY: WHAT REALLY HAPPENED (1992); PETER
PRINGLE & PHILIP JACOBSON, THOSE ARE REAL BULLETS, AREN'T THEY: BLOODY
SUNDAY, DERRY 30 JANUARY 1972 (2000); DON MULLAN, EYEWITNESS BLOODY
SUNDAY (1997). The marches continue to sporadically erupt into violence and the
police's response tends to be particularly violent, drawing the repeated rebuke of
Human Rights Watch and other organizations. See Human Rights Watch,
Monitoring the Northern Ireland Marching Season 1999,
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/nireland99/back.htm; Lawyers Committee For
Human Rights, Human Rights in Northern Ireland,
http://www.lchr.org/n.ireland/peace.htm.
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with my passport and a letter stating my affiliation to the university
and research centre and expressing my good, non-political intentions.
The officer said to me, "Mr. Joyce, that's all well and good, but
please stop the camera or it comes with me."
I replied cautiously, knowing that I was within the law, but that
in the North delicacy of language is necessary and misperception
dangerous, "I'm sorry sir, but I'm only recording the public [non-
military] sections of the walls and am turning off the camera at the
installations."
To which he pointedly remarked, "Eamon, are you familiar
with the Emergency Provisions Act or the Prevention of Terrorism
Act? If you don't turn off the camera, you'll come with me as well,
understand?"
His statement was a threat, not at all veiled but explicit, as he
alone held the power in this interaction. His threat was one I
understood fully as an Irish-American with Republican 49 political
leanings and one with which I had to comply. He was able to threaten
me because though I am a United States passport holder whose family
left Ireland almost 150 years ago, my name signifies "Irish Catholic",
"Gaelic," "Republican," and even "IRA" and inherently, through its
reassertion of my ancestors' once native tongue, connotes opposition
to British rule.
Although I was in Derry at a time of great peace and hope as a
broad cease fire was in place in the wake of the newly minted
Northern Ireland Peace Agreement of 1998, his threat resonated with
me because I was aware of my continued disempowerment within that
context where Irish Catholic, particularly Gaelic, remains silenced and
subordinate. The Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act (EPA)50
allows for the arrest and detention for up to four hours of any
individual suspected of committing or believed about to commit any
offense. Under the EPA, individuals suspected of terrorist offenses are
tried in "Diplock courts" without a jury. 5 1  Furthermore, the
49 Irish Republican, meaning I support the reunification of the 26 southern counties
with the six gerrymandered northern counties into the proper Irish Republic.
50 The EPA has its roots in the 1922-23 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act
(Northern Ireland) which after the civil rights uprisings and conflict from 1969-71
took on permanent status as the EPA. See e.g., ANTHONY JENNINGS, JUSTICE UNDER
FIRE: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1-23 (1988).
51 The Diplock courts have been roundly criticized by scholars and human rights
groups for ignoring internationally recognized standards for due process. See Steven
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Prevention of Terrorism Act allows the police to arrest without a
warrant any person believed to be involved in terrorism, and to detain
and interrogate those persons for up to 48 hours without any legal
representation or judicial review; thereafter, many such detainees can
be held for seven days without charge in Northern Ireland. Simply
put, I was faced with a system of justice that had no concern for my
nationality, gender, class or higher education. In that moment the
privileges which I hold as a form of property in the United States were
lost; instead, only one characteristic mattered - my Irishness 52 - and
it alone was enough to strip me of my choice and dignity.
Greer & Anthony White, A Return to Trial by Jury, in JUSTICE UNDER Fire, supra
note 50, at 47-72; Report of the UN. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of
Judges and Lawyers Regarding the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland (1998);
Human Rights Watch, JUSTICE FOR ALL? An Analysis of the Human Rights
Provisions of the 1998 Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, Vol. 10, No. 3 (D)
(1998).
52 1 am aware that some may criticize me by saying that the officer's decision to
harass me was not racial, religious or ethnic but was a prank of some sort or a
general random desire to badger an outsider. However, I fail to find such criticism
salient given the history of the RUC and their particularly fierce opposition to Gaelic
and other signifiers of a proud Irish identity. My name, Eamon (or the even more
Gaelic Eamon or tamonn) means "happy protection" or "the protector." The name
carries a nationalist connotation as often those who name their children "Eamon" are
inspired by the first Irish Taoiseach Eamon De Valera who was also a freedom
fighter as Commandant in the Irish National Uprising of 1916. Additionally, my
surname "Joyce" (or "Sheoigheach" in Gaelic - though must Sheoigheachs became
assimilated Joyces under British imperialist rule) is particularly ethnic Irish in that
the Joyce clan hails from some of the least assimilated, Gaelic-speaking regions of
Ireland - counties Galway and Mayo (despite the most famous Joyce, James, being
a Dubliner). For discussion of the RUC's racism and essentialist focus on the ethnic
Irish see, Twelve Year Old Arrested for Speaking Irish
http://www.web.apc.org/-ara/documents/news/un27/irish.html (discussing how an
RUC officer in Deny arrested a child for giving his name in Irish although the boy,
"Gearoid 0 Dochartaigh" was a native Irish speaker and had never been called by
another name); GRAHAM ELLISON, YOUTH, POLICING AND VICTIMISATION IN
NORTHERN IRELAND REFORMING THE ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY (2000)
(noting the RUC is plagued by institutionalized racism and finding that the majority
of Catholics in Northern Ireland had been harassed by the police force); ANDREW
HAMILTON, LINDA MOORE & TIM TRIMBLE, POLICING A DIVIDED SOCIETY: ISSUES
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I convey this story, not to appeal for sympathy or compassion;
rather, I use it to display the temporality of privilege. I believe my
story helps illustrate the social constructions of power, while allowing
me to come to terms with feelings of degradation and fear-that I have
never personally experienced in the United States, though many
groups and individuals in this country must regularly confront such
ignominies. In some perverse sense, before I was disempowered on
that rainy northern Irish afternoon, I could not directly relate to the
visceral emotion of being judged and subordinated based on largely
immutable characteristics. 53  I do not mean to imply that I think all
persons must face such events to gain credibility within the discourse
of equality, but I do maintain that, for me, the experience still
resonates and brings me in touch with the physical reality of inequality
in a way that was previously impossible.
54
While I am reluctant to make personal experience with the
dynamic of disempowerment an essential element in forming the
raised consciousness that I believe an emancipatory ethic based on
disarming privilege requires, I must admit that I have a great deal of
skepticism about the possibility of traditional, unrooted intellectuals
being the torchbearers of such a radical perspective. In this vein, I am
greatly influenced by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci's writings
AND PERCEPTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1995) (recommending among other
measures: Catholic recruitment to the police service, demilitarization of policing,
removal of much of the RUC's current imperial, Protestant, sectarian symbolism, as
well as the formation of a completely independent investigative agency to research
complaints).
53 I do not mean to imply that race, gender and class are simply immutable, texture-
less characteristics, rather I argue that the assimilationist color-blind, gender-blind
society which operates from a position of power particularly within the law views
them as such. I, however, believe it is necessary for the law and other systems of
social control to begin to view such categories from a perspective of "culture race"
as set forth by Neil Gotanda, where cultural diversity as well as the inter-locking
natures of oppression are acknowledged in richer terms. See generally Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1991).
54 I do not think I'm unique in that an individual encounter with structural or
embedded discrimination sets off an enhanced feeling of knowledge and recognition
of unconscious racism and society-wide discrimination (as opposed to that
perpetrated by individual actors) which otherwise the person in the privileged role
would be less likely to see or acknowledge. See Sharon E. Rush, Sharing Space.-
Why Racial Goodwill Isn't Enough, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing how the
author, a white female law professor, recognizes the breadth of unconscious racism
after witnessing a series of incidents involving her Black adopted daughter).
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on intellectuals 55 and find his passages on "organic intellectuals"
pertinent to the coalition politics I envision. 56 For Gramsci, an organic
intellectual is one of the people - operating relatively free of the
traditional hierarchical constraints of intellectuals. The organic
intellectual emerges from a particular social group, sharing many of
that group's basic conceptions (though grounds for contestation
55 See Antonio Gramsci, The Intellectuals, in READINGS IN MARXIST SOCIOLOGY
168-177 (Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode eds., 1983).
56 I also confess that I was somewhat surprised to find that very few radical legal
theorists continue to utilize Gramsci's theoretical frameworks in formalizing their
praxis. I can only guess that Gramsci's overwhelmingly Marxist outlook is viewed
by some as cumbersome and not easily adaptable to multi-cultural politics.
However, I believe the scholars who have reapplied Gramsci have been effective in
connecting the organic intellectual to the praxis needed in today's pursuit of
equality. See generally, Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (arguing
against abstract philosophy, saying: "[W]e must look to what Gramsci called
'organic intellectuals,' grassroots philosophers who are uniquely able to relate theory
to the concrete experience of oppression"); CORNEL WEST, PROPHESY OF
DELIVERANCE, 121-22 (1982) (discussing the application of organic intellectuals to
Black culture); Margaret E. Montoya, Academic Mestizaje: Re/Producing Clinical
Teaching and Re/Framing Wills as Latina Praxis, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 349
(1997) (using Gramsci's vision to focus on self-examination of intellectuals who
come from marginalized communities in forming pragmatic Lat/Crit theory);
Enrique Carraso, Intellectuals, Awkwardness, and Activism: Towards Social Justice
Via Progressive Instability, 2 HARV. LAT1NO L. REV. 317 (1997) (examining how it
is essential to pair theory and criticism to "ignite a progressive consciousness
between ourselves and 'organic intellectuals' in our communities); Anthony E.
Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990) (discussing Dr. King as an example
of a modem organic intellectual). Richard Delgado and Gerald Torres also make
cursory references to Gramsci and organic intellectuals without delving into or
applying the theory. See Richard Delgado, Pep Talks for the Poor: A Reply and
Remonstrance on the Evils of Scapegoating, 71 B.U.L. REV. 525 (1991); Richard
Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device. Or, Do you Really Want to
be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1991); Gerald Torres, Environmental
Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431 (1994); Gerald Torres,
Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist Ideal and the Hope of Plural
Justice -- Some Observations and Questions of an Emerging Phenomenon, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 993 (1991).
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remain), and acts as a thinker and organizer within that group to lead a
movement with a political, emancipatory vision.57 Once the organic
intellectual establishes himself or herself within the group, he or she
can spread the group's vision to others, thereby moving from a
position of resistance to one of revolutionary action. As such, the
traditional intellectual, sitting atop the hierarchy with no connection to
underprivileged disempowered communities - no real rootedness -
cannot be a leader within the dynamic I envision. Perhaps the
traditional intellectual (envision the thinker trapped in the ivory tower,
or alternately the typical law school professor and dean as described
by Delgado throughout Rodrigo's Chronicles, detached from the
people and the true issues) will begin to embrace a progressive vision
once the organic intellectual and his or her community have mobilized
and disseminated their message through the organic intellectual
meeting the traditional intellectual in discourse. Indeed, I argue that
many whites who view themselves as liberal suffer from a lack of a
truly progressive vision because they have not been exposed to the
issues facing disempowered communities. However, through
exposure to organic, rooted intellectuals, I see the possibility for
bridges and multi-cultural, intersectional coalition building.
58
Yet, the modern organic intellectual undeniably faces a great
set of challenges in staying true to and returning to a community in
which one is rooted even as he or she has obtained new sources of
knowledge and power. As Margaret E. Montoya remarks, "I think
there may be something important for those of us who come from poor
and marginalized communities. Are we organic intellectuals? Can we
be academics and remain connected to our communities?" 59 I believe
the answer to each of her questions is "Yes," but the connectedness
and cognizance of one's position of intellectual flux requires listening
to the voices of the community of which he or she is a part. Moreover,
57 See Gramsci, supra note 55, at 176-177.
"8 Which is certainly not to say that the organic intellectual will be perfect,
encompassing every nuance of a community's problems and interests. Rather, the
organic intellectual is promising because he or she has the unique position of
engaging in discourse with his or her community as well as with traditional
intellectuals who will in all likelihood continue to hold political power. As such,
organic intellectuals have the opportunity to make their communities' voices heard
by greater society, thus eventually pushing toward a greater consciousness and
specifically an acknowledgement (and eventual revision and release) of the workings
of privilege.
59 Montoya, supra note 56, at 367.
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it requires the organic intellectual to face the challenge of connections
to communities who are unwilling to engage in broader dialogue or
communities which go even further and cast the intellectual out of the
fold or brand him or her a "sell-out."
MOVING FROM DISEMPOWERMENT TO
MULTI-CULTURAL, OPPOSITIONAL THEORY
I use the Ireland vignette as a constant reminder to myself
about the ways in which I continue to be privileged and can return to
my privileged space. In this country, because of the way I dress and
appear, unlike Patricia Williams, I will likely never encounter a
shopkeeper who keeps me from his or her store as I attempt to go
Christmas shopping. ° Here, I can also do well and not be called a
credit to my race 61 and as a male I will generally "feel welcomed and
'normal' in the usual walks of public life institutional and social. 62
Furthermore, I will also never have to explain my sexual orientation or
fear being disowned because of the sexual choices I make, nor will I
face the greater stigma of having my "tongue tied" by the interlocking
nature of racism, classism and homophobia.63 No, here in this space
and on this page, I am a privileged intellectual, but I believe with that
privilege comes a responsibility.
60 See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, The Death of the Profane (a commentary on the genre of
legal writing), in THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 40-51 (1991) (eloquently
describing Williams' rage and shame when a Benetton employee refused to buzz her
into the store on account of her "round brown face."
61 See Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege, in CRITICAL WHITE
STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 291-99 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic
eds., 1997) (presenting a long list of such privileges that whites and males hold
within American society).6 2 id.
63 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and
Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561 (1997)
(discussing Marlon Riggs' poem and film Tongues Untied and arguing such
interlocking biases affect judicial decisionmaking in cases involving questions of
gay and lesbian equality).
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I believe that I have a responsibility to "out" these supposedly
hidden systems of dominance and to confront the ways in which I've
benefited from the unspoken systems of privilege so as to begin the
process of dismantling these systems. Peggy McIntosh writes: "To
redesign social systems we need first to acknowledge their colossal
unseen dimensions. The silences and denials surrounding privilege are
the key political tool here. They keep the thinking about equality or
equity incomplete, protecting unearned advantage and conferred
dominance by making these taboo subjects. '64 And so I begin the task
of using my admittedly privileged voice to attack the systems that
have accorded my voice this Ivy League space. bell hooks writes:
While it is important that individuals work to transform
their consciousness, striving to be anti-racist, it is
important to remember that the struggle to end white
supremacy is a struggle to change a system, a structure.
•.. For our efforts to end white supremacy to be truly
effective, individual struggle to change consciousness
must be fundamentally linked to collective effort to
transform those structures that reinforce and perpetuate
white supremacy.
65
Some describe this responsibility as becoming a "race
traitor., 66 On one hand, I understand the value in what Gayatri Spivak
calls the "strategic essentialism ' 67 of such racial coding. While
strategic essentialism posits that groups have "essential attributes," it
newly empowers the group by allowing the group to define itself
rather than allowing outsiders to define the group as a means of
oppression. Moreover, strategic essentialism gathers strength in that
the essential attributes are admittedly socially constructed. The group
acknowledges that the attributes are not inherent or natural, yet they
are invoked when it is politically useful to do so. However, I also feel
some revulsion at the term "race traitor" because although I express a
similar intent to fight against the norms of whiteness, maleness,
heterosexism, classism, and the myth of meritocracy, I am fearful that
64 McIntosh, supra note 61, at 298.
65 HOOKS, supra note 18, at 195.
66 See Noel Ignatiev, How to Be a Race Traitor: Six Ways to Fight Being White, in
CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES, supra note 61, at 613.
67 See GAYATRI SPIVAK, Subaltern Studies. Deconstructing Historiography, in
SELECTED SUBALTERN STUDIES (Gayatri Spivak & Ranajit Guha eds., 1988).
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such essentialism will forever link whiteness with malignance.68 In
the emancipatory ethic I seek, I hope that someday whiteness is freed
of its solely negative connotations. As Martha Mahoney writes:
Because whiteness is a transparent and dominant norm,
part of the transformative project necessarily involves
exposing white privilege to white people .... At other
times, a preference for whiteness reflects a preference
for the qualities that have been attached to whiteness...
. Transformative work on whiteness therefore requires
attacking its power as a dominant norm, while seeking
points of potential for change in the social construction
of whiteness.
69
68 As I have expressed above, I remain deeply skeptical about the role of whites in
multi-cultural politics and realize that great progress must occur before whiteness is
ever linked with a renunciation of privilege, yet such a project remains my long term
goal. Currently, I believe the interrogation and dismantling of whiteness must push
on; however, at some stage, I think it will be necessary to break from "what
whiteness means ideologically," as Becky Thompson and White Women
Challenging Racism remark, "for me to buy into thinking there's something wrong
with me because I am white-skinned is wrong. If I perpetuate the system, then I am
a piece of the negative history." Becky Thompson and White Women Challenging
Racism, Home/Work. Antiracism Activism and the Meaning of Whiteness, in OFF
WHITE, supra note 3, 357-58, 354-66.
69 Martha R. Mahoney, Shaping American Communities: Segregation, Housing &
the Urban Poor: Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REv.
1659, 1676-77 (1995) (emphasis added).
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In my scholarship and in my work as a lawyer, 70 my greatest
challenges will be finding ways to establish alliances with people of
color,7 1 women and those discriminated against because of their sexual
orientation that neither minimize their reasons for distrust nor require
me to de-race, de-gender, or de-sexually orient myself Thus, I believe
that my privileged voice has an essential role to play within liberation
politics and within radical legal reform. I need to constantly remind
myself that even as I walk through the ivory towers - and ivy halls -
each day, I must remain organically connected to the community and
social setting from which I came (a white male, heterosexual, feminist,
anti-racist progressive among many doubters). Recently, Derrick Bell
has addressed the role of whites in liberation politics and the
continuing pursuit of progressive civil rights law in his essay, Wanted.
A White Leader Able to Free Whites of Racism.
72
Bell states that he has not forgotten the power of courts as
vehicle for social reform, but warns those seeking litigation as their
tool for social reform that litigation achieves its greatest success when
political policy makers and the public support the positions advocated
in test cases. 73 He notes that conservatives have scored major victories
70 As a lawyer, I will eventually have the opportunity to utilize my voice in the
projects I take on, the clients I represent as well as in the voices I use in the
courtroom. In doing so my desire is to remain faithful to a form of radical lawyering
as set forth by Julie Su, one that employs voices inside and outside the legal system,
combining lawyering and activism for maximum efficacy. See Julie Su, Making the
Invisible Visible: The Garment Industry's Dirty Laundry, 1 J. GENDER, RACE &
JUSTICE 405, 405 (1998). In the meantime, vast sums of undergraduate and law
school debt necessitate that I work in a corporate law firm setting for a period of
time. Yet, I believe that even in this framework I can remain true to my
responsibilities. First, I have an obligation to take on as much pro bono work as
possible, sacrificing (in some perverse sense) my climb up the profitability and
corporate ladder for the opportunity to utilize my voice and push my vision for
greater equality. Additionally, with my superiors in the office, I can follow my
mission by not hiding my politics and my true voice, pushing for what I believe in
on committees on hiring, pro bono matters, etc.; again trading the promises of
financial advancement which come with remaining a silent, complacent, privileged
person for the opportunity, however small, to change the corporate culture.
71 See Thompson, supra note 68, at 358, with whom I credit the idea of "challenge"
as they discuss it in the racial sphere but do not explicitly embrace the
intersectionality I pursue.
72 Bell, supra note 24.
73 Id. at 529. See also, DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (1980)
(arguing that within American constitutional law, Blacks and other minorities are
more apt to obtain relief when such relief also serves the interests of, largely white,
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in the affirmative action arena while winning the war of public
opinion. To combat this, and other tides of retrenchment, Bell states,
"[M]y title does not promise new legal strategies but instead calls for
new leadership in the fight against racism - to be more specific, new
white leadership. 74
While I agree with many of Bell's insights as to the problems
of racial pathologies facing American whites and even his suggestions
on the personal work that he believes whites must do, I ultimately find
his conclusions short-sighted and harmful to real progressive
movements within and outside of law. In Gramscian terms, Bell
searches for a traditional white intellectual when an organic white
intellectual is needed for any tangible social progress. Bell is right to
remind us that in this era of conservative jurisprudence the
effectiveness of equality-seeking litigation has been hindered.75 His
desire for charismatic leadership to sway the public and policymakers
so that litigation can gain maximum efficacy is indeed a necessary
task.76
However, to ensure that litigation may be aligned with
progressive politics, Bell calls for:
[N]ew leadership in the fight against racism - to be
more specific, new white leadership .... The leaders I
seek and that this country needs must be well-known,
able to be heard and with the power or charisma to be
taken seriously. Let me say quickly, emphatically, and
somewhat sadly, that the leadership we need cannot be
filled by a black person.77
policymakers); Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (noting that Brown provided
credibility to America's struggle against communist countries in the war of equality
rhetoric).
74 Bell, supra note 24, at 531.
71 Id. at 528-29.
7 6 
Id. at 529.
77Id. at 531.
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Bell claims that Jesse Jackson's runs for the presidency evidenced the
fact that on racial issues, "any black's message will be dismissed at
best as special pleading and at worst as racial condemnation. 78 Bell
then notes that he once thought President Clinton might have been the
necessary white leader, but with that failure, a new white leader is
needed to deliver a three-point message about race: (1) race in
America is white problem rather than a Black one, (2) racism may
never be overcome and could play a permanent role in American
social structures, and (3) even if eradicating racism is an impossible
goal, the fight for tolerance and equality carries an inherent value.79 I
support the content of Bell's three-point message and even agree with
the utility of white agency in delivering such a message. However,
Bell's search for such a Messianic white leader strikes me as
colonialist, missionary-like and antithetical to the hope for broad-
based, intersectional coalitions whose promise lies in their ability to
empower groups and voices who have been silenced within the
discourse.
8
Which is not to say that I, too, do not share Bell's frustration
with the abdication of white, male Democratic politics with regard to
the needs of communities of color, women, homosexuals, and
organized labor. As I've tried to articulate, I believe that the
privileged have an outstanding moral obligation to use their positions
of power to be advocates for equality. Yet being a white, privileged
voice myself, I want to carry my responsibility to talk about these
matters, but I do not want to do so as a lone voice, the voice of
authority that society has enabled white, heterosexual males like me to
be for so long. Rather, I hope that my voice strikes a chord not only
with those of my background, but with those who look very different
and are situated in very different contexts than I am, for this is the
promise of intersectional politics.
781d. at 532.
79 id,
80 I do acknowledge that Bell's statement strikes me as particularly unusual and may
even be a tongue-in-cheek roust given many of his past writings on race, many of
which argue that racism is an intractable societal problem. See generally, Derrick
Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis: Courageous Revelation or Unconscious
Denial of Racial Genocide, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 571, 573 (1993) ("Racism is an
integral, permanent, and indestructible component of the society."); DERRICK BELL,
FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); Derrick
Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 376 (1992); DERRICK BELL, AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED (1987)
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In dichotomizing the white and Black perspectives, without
even considering the voices of Latina/os, Asians and other racial
minorities let alone tackling other categories of oppression, Bell's
argument smacks of missionary zeal and is overstated, implicitly
affirming a continued legacy of privilege which the white, empowered
voice carries. The white voice obviously continues to carry privilege,
but in searching for his white leader from upon high rather than from
within a rooted community, Bell undermines many of the possibilities
for coalition. In sum, I have great doubts that the white, Clinton-like,
disconnected white voice that Bell seeks has the background and
history at his or her disposal to espouse the message that Bell wants
this emancipatory white intellectual to convey. Bell correctly notes
that "[t]he ideology of whiteness continues to oppress whites as well
as blacks. Whites employ whiteness to make whites settle for despair
in politics and anguish in the daily grind of life.",81 However, I see my
role in the escape not as the white missionary or colonizer, bringing
truth to the illiterate masses; instead - in Bell's articulation - I see
my voice as improperly set apart and improperly privileged. 82 My
goal then is to cast a critical eye to my position so that I may return to
my community, rediscover my rootedness in a multiplicity of
perspectives I have occupied during my life in order to re-align myself
with others to discuss race, class, sexual orientation and gender, and to
begin the arduous process of disassembling many of the very systems
of power which got me here. However, on an individual level but also
within a greater social dynamic, I must face the question: What is to be
done about whiteness and these other "nesses"?
8 1 Bell, supra note 24, at 535.
82 McIntosh distinguishes between earned strength and power conferred
systematically. She writes, "Power from unearned privilege can look like strength
when it is, in fact, privilege to escape or dominate.... [Some], like the privilege not
to listen to less powerful people distort the humanity of the holders as well as the
ignored groups." Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal
Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, 30,
22-33 in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTs READER (Leslie Bender &
Daan Braveman eds., 1995). As such, I envision a society where my voice earns
strength through its message rather than through my unearned status.
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Like Becky Thompson and White Women Challenging
Racism, I believe that "[w]e [whites as well as, in my case,
heterosexual, middle class men] must claim a reality (that we have
white skin [etc.]) and deal with unearned privileges as we show that
the hierarchy is, itself, an invention." 83 Bell's undying emphasis on
white leadership, in some ways, obfuscates the social construction of
that hierarchy - he reifies the differences between the power
relationships and us and is reluctant to see where the white intellectual
must be an organic product of his or her social position. For this white
intellectual to succeed, he or she must in Gramscian terms "emerge
and be formed by the lived experiences of the working class,
combining understanding and passion, utopianism and pragmatism,
theory and practice, the political and the social. 84  I intend to let go
of what unearned privileges I can, attempting to use those I inherently
retain, as I try to do now within the law school setting, during my
professional career to challenge the hierarchy and to argue for
inclusiveness legally and politically. Martha Mahoney argues that
such a challenge is a key initial step in challenging whiteness and its
dominance on the whole. She remarks, "My goal is to identify those
points about whiteness that are most susceptible to change -
especially those points that reveal potential for undermining the
construction of privilege and subordination and for uniting whites,
along with people of color, in opposition to privilege."85  Such an
endeavor means making decisions about which unearned benefits I
will decline; in effect, it entails rejecting the fruits of my privileged
position by taking on a voice which does not carry the traditional
canon, disrupting the normal functioning of the largely white, male
institutions which desire me as a member. In doing so, I suspect I will
give up much of my ability to rise easily through such institutions.
Peggy McIntosh argues that I do not have much to lose, she
writes: "Our male colleagues do not have a great deal to lose in
supporting Women's Studies, but they do not have a great deal to lose
if they oppose it either. They simply have the power to decide
whether to commit themselves to more equitable distributions of
power. ' 86  In certain respects, I agree that adopting a voice not
83 Thompson, supra note 68, at 357.
84 Montoya, supra note 56, at 367-68.
85 Martha R. Mahoney, The Social Construction of Whiteness, in CRITICAL WHITE
STUDIES, supra note 61, 330, 330-333.
86 McIntosh, supra note 61, at 297.
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typically coded as "white," "male" or "straight" does not free me of
the property benefits which society still wishes to unfairly award. Yet,
in other respects, I disagree strongly as the privileged have much to
lose by letting go. Acknowledging that the meritocracy is a falsehood,
that one is not deserving of the status and other material conditions,
and indeed letting go of that wealth and status, is not easy. For if it
was, I assume more people would have let go sooner, moving us closer
to the egalitarian society I envision. Looking beyond our perspectives
and attempting to yield the spaces which our voices occupy to others is
not easy. I espouse a Gramscian-styled intellectualism, to engage in a
legal discourse which succeeds on the grounds Mari Matsuda
describes: "[W]hen notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice,
are examined not from an abstract position but from the position of
groups who have suffered through history, moral relativism recedes
and identifiable normative priorities emerge." 87 Noel Ignatiev speaks
about letting go of the privilege:
For the white race to be effective [in maintaining its
privilege and subordinating others], it must be
unanimous, or nearly so. The reason is that if the cops
and the courts and so forth couldn't be sure that every
person who looked white was loyal to the system, then
what would be the point of extending privileges to
whites? . . .Our strategy seeks to bring together a
determined minority, willing to defy white rules so
flagrantly they make it impossible to pretend that all
those who look white are loyal to the system of racial
oppression.
88
In my work and life, I aspire to flagrantly defy the rules of
privilege 89 that I have been accorded, but realize that devoting my
87 Matsuda, supra note 56, at 325.
88 An interview with Noel Ignatiev of Race Traitor magazine, Treason to Whiteness
is Loyalty to Humanity, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES, supra note 61, 611.
89 In some ways this defiance simply entails recognizing my race and the set of
assumptions and values it carries, exposing whiteness as non-value-free. For as
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life's work to such a mission will not be easy. Edward Said writes of
being an oppositional voice: "The hardest aspect of being an
intellectual is to represent what you profess through your work and
interventions, without hardening into an institution or a kind of
automaton acting at the behest of a system or method." 90 In this next
phase of my life, as I prepare to enter employment as a litigator within
a large corporate culture, I take Said's advice and say: I will work for
this firm, but I will not become the institution.91 These sacrifices may
indeed be small, to most observers I will remain a white male who has
succeeded in corporate culture, leading a comfortable life with a
handsome wage (albeit dented by an amount of loans that neither I nor
my family could have imagined as I embarked on this path of higher
and legal education years ago). I accept those criticisms, in no way do
I hope to attain martyrdom. However, I will try to remain on the edge,
challenging the system that put me here and looking at every
opportunity to open the system's doors to others not so privileged. In
my practice of law itself, on an instrumental level, my goal is to hear
the narratives of others, 92 for part of whiteness and its power is the
ability to combine my narrative, opinion and voice with another that
needs to be heard - fighting for power through cooperation and
community. In relating to clients, this means listening and learning
from them to empower my lawyering and the case on the whole.
Anthony Alfieri remarks that in the pursuit of transformative legalism,
"[s]ituated outside lawyer-told client story is an alternative client story
composed of multiple narratives, each speaking in a different voice of
Grillo and Wildman remark: "This privilege to ignore-their race gives whites a
societal advantage distinct from any received from the existence of discriminatory
racism." GRILLO & WILDMAN, supra note 17, at 649.
90 EDWARD SAID, REPRESENTATIONS OF THE INTELLECTUAL, 121 (1994).
91 Indeed, during my summer at the firm while I found my work intellectually
stimulating and my pro bono work genuinely impacting social change and the
protection of individual rights, I found that work alone could not satisfy me
completely. As such, I left work early one or two nights per week to tutor at the
Maya Angelou Public Charter School in Washington, DC - an endeavor that
brought me closer to my community and the people whom social change most needs
to reach, children. The school itself is a remarkable venture, I will continue working
there during my time in Washington and urge others to do the same or contribute
otherwise. For information on the school see www.seeforever.org.
92 Mari Matsuda writes, "We can choose to know the lives of others by reading,
studying, listening, and venturing into different places. For lawyers, our pro bono
work may be the most effective means of acquiring a broader consciousness of
oppression." Supra note 8, at 8.
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the client .... When the client's voices are silenced and her narratives
are displaced by the lawyer's narratives, client integrity is tarnished
and client story is lost."
93
Yet, I must act to find solutions that not only operate on an
individual level but must also seek those which operate in greater
society. For Manning Marable, the intellectual's role is to be an
opposing force, fighting against that which is "value free" and unjust.
He believes the intellectual must function at all levels, both writing
and demonstrating, both working inside and outside the system,
opposing its power base and structures unconditionally. "All art and
aesthetics, scientific inquiry, and social studies are directly or
indirectly linked to ... the existing set of power relationships which
dictates the policies of the modem state." 94 My goal, like Marable's,
is to create a unity between various groups, but I must confess that the
task is more arduous than scholars, theorists and activists care to admit
and I remain skeptical about the ease with which coalitions can be
formed because of the multiple dynamics such a progressive move
entails.95 Regardless, the move must begin with an examination of
self and the individual dynamics of whiteness. Marable, too, sees such
examination of whiteness as a necessary first step:
To move into the future will require that we bury the
racial barriers of the past, for good. The essential point
of departure is the Reconstruction of the idea of
"whiteness," the ideology of white power privilege, and
elitism which remains heavily embedded within the
93 Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of
Client Narrative, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTNG EDGE, supra note 14,
602, 600-606.
94 Manning Marable, Speaking Truth to Power, 200 (1996).
95 See MANNING MARABLE, Beyond Racial Identity Politics: Towards a Liberation
Theory for Multicultural Democracy, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING
EDGE, supra note 14, 448, 448-454 ("The task of constructing a tradition of unity
between various groups of color in America is a far more complex and contradictory
process than any progressive activists or scholars have admitted, precisely because
of divergent cultural traditions, languages and conflicting politics of racial identities
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dominant culture, social institutions, and economic
arrangements of our society. We must rethink and
restructure the central social categories of collective
struggle by which we conceive and understand our own
political reality.
96
Only by first identifying white communities of solidarity and
resistance - finding shared interests intraracially and examining their
material underpinnings - will whites begin the effective work of
moving toward multi-cultural coalition building. Martha Mahoney
outlines several starting points for the transition from individual white
consciousness to broader group dynamics. She suggests that within
white communities, "[w]hen class is understood to refer to labor, to a
set of shared interests in a system of production, shared interests
immediately appear that have the potential to help whites understand
the need for antiracist unity with people of color."97  Mahoney
suggests that we whites translate our individual examination of white
privilege into a discourse within our workplaces and residences that
shows whiteness to be "historically located and subject to change."
98
Mahoney believes such a focus would allow whites to find their shared
interests with communities of color through labor solidarity and push
whites to realize that whiteness has been used by elites to mask the
fact that long-term economic trends in the United States have
disfavored all working-class people. 99 Finally, Mahoney argues that it
is necessary to expose programs largely viewed as race-neutral0 0 as
96 Id. at 452-53 (emphasis added).
97 Martha R. Mahoney, Shaping American Communities: Segregation, Housing &
the Urban Poor: Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1659, 1681 (1995).
98 Id. at 1682.
99 See id.
100 Mahoney writes: "In America, social and economic programs do not exist outside
the process of the construction of race. Programs like public housing, Medicaid,
welfare, and food stamps have become publicly "raced" and endowed with a racial
character (marked as nonwhite) in white perception and in much political discourse
despite the fact that whites are at least a plurality of the beneficiaries. Programs such
as aid to farmers and bailouts for large corporations are officially treated as if they
are 'non-raced' when in actuality they are "white-raced." In the category of social
programs covertly coded white, I would include Social Security, because as enacted
it so thoroughly excluded so many African-Americans. The social construction of
race is capable of overtaking nonracial programs, stigmatizing them as 'assistance'
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race-conscious so that white individuals begin class-conscious and
race-conscious self-identity work in the challenging move toward
coalitions.
Accordingly, each day on an individual level, I will aspire to
face my life and career, realizing that my privilege is temporal - a
product of socially constructed power relationships - and fighting
against it. I will try to situate myself and my voice within the
alienation I experienced that day in Ireland, and I will try to act as an
organic intellectual, changing the institutions within which I work and
live to prevent others and eventually myself from facing such
alienation. To begin the intellectual process of emancipation from
white privilege, it is necessary that I interact and try to organically
inform others who share such privilege, pushing those around me to
examine their material conditions as well as the benefits and inherent
privilege their skin holds. 10 Becky Thompson and White Women
Challenging Racism remark:
Building alliances with white people is a key way to
counter the isolation we have sometimes faced as white
antiracist people. . . Those white people who are
and treating them as 'racial' whenever any significant proportion of benefits is
provided to people of color." Id. at 1683.
101 1 realize that this is perhaps the most difficult of the organic intellectual's duties:
returning to one's own community, a community in which he or she may be
disempowered as well. Enrique Carraso examines the struggles which the organic
intellectual of color will face in returning to his or her community. While this
analysis does not apply directly to me, a white intellectual, I believe the difficulties
he highlights are emblematic of the gravity of the challenges we face in mobilizing
our coalitions. "The ... dilemma relates to the nature of our ties to the community.
We should question the claim that we are steeped in the communities we seek to
empower. We live in comfortable neighborhoods, sometimes far removed from the
disempowered. We spend much of our time in secluded offices or libraries located
in secluded universities. And when we are not in our offices, libraries, or
neighborhoods, we are likely to be traveling to posh conference venues. Many of us
have come to identify closely with the dominant and comfortable culture of
academe. Surely there is a great gulf between us and the people we have targeted as
beneficiaries of our activism." Intellectuals, Awkwardness, and Activism: Towards
Social Justice Via Progressive Instability, 2 HARV. LATNO L. REV. 317, 318 (1997).
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trying to do justice work in isolated situations ... end
up needing to imagine a community that will be both
supportive and hold us accountable.' 
02
102 Thompson, supra note 68, at 361.
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